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Numerous studies have shown that political elections affect stock markets. Herbst and 
Slinkman (1984), Huang (1985), Hensel and Ziemba (1995), and Santa-Clara and Valkanov 
(2003) analyze the difference in stock returns under Republican and Democratic presidents of the 
United States.1 Pantzalis et al. (2000) show that stock markets are affected around political 
election dates across 33 countries. Nippani and Medlin (2002) document an initial negative 
return in market indices due to the delay in the results of the 2000 presidential election. Knight 
(2006) reports that policy platforms of Gore and Bush are capitalized into equity prices for a 
sample of 70 politically sensitive firms during the 2000 U.S. presidential election. Mattozzi 
(2005) finds similar results that policy platforms are factored in the prices of politically sensitive 
stocks. These studies focus on the issues such as whether the market reacts to election news and 
whether policy platforms are capitalized into equity prices. Given all the findings, however, not 
much effort has been made to understand the information assimilation process of stock markets 
and adverse selection cost of trading at the intraday level in relation to polls and elections.  
In standard microstructure models, information asymmetry typically arises from the 
trading when a trader possesses private information. However, recent studies have shown that 
information asymmetry can also be associated with public information release.2 This type of 
information asymmetry may come from two major sources. One is heterogeneous interpretation 
of public information (see Green, 2004; Brandt and Kavajecz, 2004). Even though traders 
observe the same set of public information, they vary in their abilities to analyze it. In the present 
                                                 
1 Recently, Fair (2006) employs the data from political betting markets to measure election uncertainty not revealed 
in the polling data. 
2 Krinsky and Lee (1996) report that the adverse selection cost component of bid-ask spreads significantly increases 
surrounding the public announcements of earnings. Ito et al. (1998) provide evidence of private information in the 
foreign exchange market of Tokyo. Balduzzi et al. (2001) investigate the effects of scheduled macroeconomic 
announcements on prices, trading volume, and bid-ask spreads of Treasury securities. Green (2004) examines the 
impact of trading on government bond prices after the release of macroeconomic news, and documents a significant 
increase in the informational role of trading following economic news announcements. 
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case, the public news related to polls, elections, and recounts can create a significant information 
disparity among traders. Stocks that are more subject to the influence of election results may 
therefore experience higher information asymmetry and a larger informed trading component of 
transaction costs during the certain period of the 2000 presidential election. The other important 
source of information asymmetry is inventory information. Cao et al. (2006) show that 
compensation for bearing inventory risk introduces a link between order flow and prices even if 
customer order flow is uninformed. In this case, order flow provides information as to whether 
the price for a particular security should be higher or lower even if trading provides no 
fundamental information about the security value. By observing investors’ order flows, dealers 
possess valuable private information for forecasting future prices. News announcements on the 
pending presidential election impact stock prices and generate hedging demands. Dealers with 
larger customer order flows hold a greater informational advantage and so information 
asymmetry would be higher following the important election news announcement. 
The 2000 presidential election offers a unique opportunity for us to study the effects of 
polls, elections, and recounts on stock trading and its informational role. This event is different 
from elections in any other years. Normally the election outcome would be clear by the end of 
the election day or the following day. For the 2000 presidential election, however, there was no 
clear winner by the end of November 7th or the next morning. Florida’s electoral votes were too 
close to call, and so a recount was started. The uncertainty continued for 36 days until Al Gore 
publicly conceded the presidency on December 13. This unprecedented event resulted in 
tremendous uncertainty for the election outcome stranded over a period of 36 days which were 
full of news reports for petitions, recounting, halting, and restarting of ballot recounts. These 
announcements may set off various interpretations among traders and investors and thus induce 
informational heterogeneity. In addition, this unusual event is strictly pertaining to the 
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presidential election, not Congressional races. It thus allows us to control for other factors and to 
focus exclusively on the effects of information release for the presidential election on stock 
trading.  
In this paper, we investigate the informational role of stock trading in relation to polls and 
elections. Specifically, we examine three types of firms that are possibly subject to the influence 
of election results, i.e., partisan industries, top donors, and favored firms under the Bush/Gore 
political platforms. Using the three testing samples of stocks and a controlling sample, we 
examine the components of intraday trading costs in the base period (7/1/2000-8/31/2000), the 
polling period (9/1/2000-11/6/2000), the election & recount period (11/7/2000-12/13/2000), and 
the post-recount period (12/14/2000-12/31/2000).  
Our paper documents several interesting findings. First, we find that the political 
uncertainty in the 2000 presidential election causes information asymmetry in the financial 
market. As a consequence, the adverse-selection component of trading cost for the politically 
sensitive stocks under the Bush/Gore political platforms increases significantly during the 
election & recount period and the post-recount period. This effect is particularly strong for the 
stocks belonging to the group of favored firms compiled by financial analysts during the 
campaign. The politically favored stocks are recommended by financial analysts in three 
securities firms based on the expected performance of the stocks under the Bush/Gore 
administrations. These stocks tend to be followed more closely by investors and speculators 
during the election. Second, there is evidence that the returns of the politically sensitive firms are 
tied to the fortune of the party that subsequently came to power, and the election news has 
impacts on both expected cash flow and discount rate of these firms. Finally, controlling for the 
effect of the liquidity cost and stock characteristics, the cross-sectional change in bid-ask spreads 
is significantly related to the change in the information cost. This finding confirms that the 
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uncertainty of the 2000 presidential election induces significant information asymmetry that 
increases the adverse selection component of trading cost.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data sample. 
Section 3 describes a transaction-level model of price formation, a regression model of changes 
in bid-ask spreads, and the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents empirical results. Finally, 
Section 5 summarizes the main findings of the paper. 
 
2. Data 
During the 2000 presidential campaign, Texas Governor George W. Bush accepted the 
Republican Party’s nomination on August 3, and Vice President Al Gore Jr. accepted the 
Democratic Party’s nomination on August 17. The Gallup tracking poll data, which gauge public 
opinion of the presidential race over two- to three-day intervals, were first released on September 
7, and then reported every day until the election day of November 7.3 Before the election day, 
Bush and Gore were neck-and-neck at the polls. After the election day, Florida’s electoral votes 
were too close to call so that a ballot recount was started, as mandated by Florida state legislature. 
Later, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Florida Supreme Court’s earlier decision, which 
put an end to any further recount. On December 13, Gore publicly conceded the presidency. 
Our sample period for the intraday data ranges from 7/1/2000 to 12/31/2000, which is 
further divided into 4 subperiods. Period I (the base period) is from 7/1/2000 to 8/31/2000. 
Period II (the polling period) is from 9/1/2000 to 11/6/2000. Period III (the election & recount 
period) is from 11/7/2000 to 12/13/2000. Period IV (the post-recount period) is from 12/14/2000 
to 12/31/2000. 
                                                 
3 The poll data released on September 7, 2000 were based on the poll conducted during September 4-6. 
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Our initial sample contains all the S&P 500 stocks obtained from the Compustat database. 
We then choose stocks from this sample according to the following criteria. (1) The average 
close price is between $1 and $200. (2) Changes in the amount of shares outstanding are less 
than 10% from 7/1/2000 to 12/31/2000. (3) The primary exchanges are the NYSE and AMEX.4 
(4) The minimum tick is $1/16. During our sample period, some stocks were included in the 
decimal pricing pilot program and were traded on decimals with the minimum tick of $0.01, 
while the rest of NYSE-listed stocks were traded on fractions with the minimum tick of $1/16.5 
Since stocks traded on fractional and decimal systems tend to differ in transaction costs, we 
select stocks traded on fractions only. The data of close price, shares outstanding, exchange, and 
minimum tick are obtained from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. After the filtering, we 
end up with 346 stocks in the sample. 
As certain industries and/or firms have more or less stake with the outcome of elections, 
we construct three testing samples and one controlling sample based on the 346 stocks. The three 
testing samples include the partisan contributing industry sample, the top donor sample, and the 
politically favored firm sample. We categorize the firms in all three samples as the politically 
sensitive firms, which are closely associated with one political party and may be particularly 
affected by the uncertainty surrounding the election. 
The information on the partisan contributing industries is collected from Shon (2006). 
Data reported by Shon (2006), such as the top contributing industries to Bush and Gore and the 
relative proportion of contributions made to Bush and Gore by industries, were originally 
collected from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP).6 The most Bush-partisan contributing 
                                                 
4 Studies find that bid-ask spreads are significantly higher on Nasdaq than on the NYSE. See Christie and Schultz 
(1994), Huang and Stoll (1996), Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), and Weston (2000). 
5 The conversion from fractional to decimal trading in the U.S. markets has significantly reduced bid-ask spreads. 
See Chakravarty et al. (2001a, 2001b), Chung et al. (2001), Bacidore et al. (2001), Gibson et al. (2002), 
Bessembinder (2003), and He and Wu (2005). 
6 See Table 2 of Shon (2006). 
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industries that overlap with our 346-stock sample include Oil & Gas, Forestry & Forest Products, 
Tobacco, Automotive, Building Materials & Equipment, Chemical & Related Manufacturing, 
Mining, Finance/Credit Companies, and Trucking. The most Gore-partisan contributing 
industries that overlap with our 346-stock sample include Environment and TV/Movies/Music. 
Using the industry codes for these industries,7 we were able to construct an initial partisan 
industry sample of 69 stocks that fall into this category, among which 61 are from the Bush-
partisan industries and 8 from the Gore-partisan industries. 
Moreover, we search the partisan industry firms directly from the website of the Center 
for Responsive Politics. The Center for Responsive Politics publishes information for major 
contributing firms for each of the 20 most partisan industries in the 2000 U.S. presidential 
election.8 The contribution data reported for each company represent total bundled contributions 
from the firm’s Political Action Committee (PAC), soft-money, and individuals associated with 
the firm. We select companies among the top contributing firms which had at least 80% of their 
contribution going to one political party but were not included in our initial 69-stock sample 
described above. Crossing with our 346 S&P stock sample, we identify 26 new most partisan 
firms. In addition, from Cheng (2005), we identify another 7 firms from oil, major drugs, and 
defense industries which were widely believed to benefit significantly from the Bush platform 
but were not included in the initial sample. In all, we add 33 firms to the initial 69-stock sample.9 
The final sample of the partisan industry category includes 102 firms. 
The second sample is constructed based on the information for the top 100 donors. The 
                                                 
7 These are based on the industry codes used in the TAQ database. 
8 The website is www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/index.asp which supplies the historical data under the election 
overview (big picture). 
9 Some of the 33 additional partisan firms were not identified in the initial sample due to the difference in industry 
classification codes.  We use the industry code in TAQ to identify the firms in an industry that is considered as 
partisan.  We find that some firms in the CRP website are in the same industry but have a different industry code 
from that provided in TAQ. 
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proportion of donations of the top 100 donors made to Bush and Gore is collected from the 
Center for Responsive Politics.10 Similar to the partisan industry firm data, the top donor data 
include all three sources of campaign contributions. Crossing the top donors with our 346-stock 
sample, we obtain 16 Bush-partisan firms and 3 Gore-partisan firms. Thus, a total of 19 stocks 
are in the category of top donors.  
The third sample includes a group of firms favored under Bush or Gore platforms in the 
2000 presidential election. The information on the favored firms under the Bush/Gore political 
platforms was collected from Knight (2006). The favored firms provided by Knight (2006) were 
originally collected from the financial analyst reports of Lehman Brothers, Prudential Securities, 
and International Strategy and Investment. These reports were produced by analysts of the three 
companies for politically sensitive individual firms during the 2000 campaign, which were likely 
to perform well under either Bush or Gore administration. They identified 41 firms likely to fare 
well under the Bush administration and 29 firms likely to fare well under the Gore administration. 
Crossing the favored firms with our 346-stock sample, we have 21 firms likely to perform well 
under the Bush platform and 11 firms likely to perform well under the Gore platform. Thus, a 
total of 32 sample stocks are in the category of favored firms under the Bush/Gore political 
platforms. Finally, the remaining 223 S&P 500 stocks that do not belong to any of the above 
three testing samples are included in the controlling sample. 
The three testing samples have different features. The data for the favored firms were 
complied by analysts from the three securities firms independently prior to the election date of 
November 7, 2000.11 Thus, these data represent ex-ante categorizations. By contrast, the data of 
                                                 
10 Again, the data for the donation of each top donor represent the total amount of contribution, including PAC, soft-
money, and individual contributions.  The top donors considered in this study are categorized by the CRP as the top 
overall donors. 
11 See Knight (2006, p. 759). In fact, using the favored-firm data, Knight (2006) only covers a period before the 
election date, i.e., from September 7 to November 6, 2000.  
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the partisan industry firms and top donors were released after the election. Some of these data 
were released on October 1, 2001 while others were released on January 3, 2002.12 Although 
these data were released after the election, there are reasons to believe that they are unlikely to be 
subject to a serious ex-post classification problem, i.e., politically sensitive firms were chosen 
because they responded to political fluctuations. First of all, the classification of the partisan 
industry and top donors was based on the contributions made during the campaign. These 
contributions were made and reported to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) before the 
election date and the ex-post release of the information for top donors and most partisan 
industries merely reflects the past fact. Furthermore, major partisan industries can be easily 
identified by the public before the election through news reports, candidate press releases, 
advertisements sponsored by political parties, and the presidential debates. For example, from 
press releases, television advertisements, and quotes from the three presidential debates, one can 
easily learn that pharmaceuticals, defense, oil & gas, and tobacco industries will fare quite well 
under the Bush administration (see Knight, 2006).13 Top donors are also often publicized by 
news agencies.14 Thus, the potential endogeneity problem arising from firms being chosen as 
partisan firms by their response to political fluctuations ex post is likely to be negligible.  
Nevertheless, the partisan contributing industry and top donor data are expected to be 
noisier than the favored firm data. The contribution amount and proportion of contribution by 
each firm and individual donor to each presidential candidate were generated from the filings 
mandated by Federal Election Campaign Act. Since the specific amount of contributions was 
released by the Federal Election Commission after the election, investors would not have 
                                                 
12 See the website of the CRP.  
13 The original paper by Knight in the NBER working paper series provides quotes from the three Presidential 
debates taken from www.issues-2002.org and candidate press releases on Washington Post, August 31 and October 
10, 2000. 
14 For example, Enron, through Kenneth Lay, was well known as a major donor to Bush during the campaign. 
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complete knowledge of the exact amount of contributions by each firm and individual over our 
sample period. This imperfection will introduce noise to the partisan contributing industry and 
top donor data samples because stock price will not completely reflect the precise amount of 
contributions by companies and individual donors. As a consequence, the empirical evidence for 
these two groups of firms may be somewhat weakened. 
In summary, among the 346 S&P 500 stocks, 123 are in the three testing samples and 223 
are in the controlling sample. Table 1 provides the list of the 123 testing firms as well as the 
categories which they belong to. The partisan industry category contains 102 stocks, the top 
donor category contains 19 stocks, and the favored firm category contains 32 stocks. In addition, 
25 firms belong to more than one category; 20 firms belong to two of the three categories, and 5 
firms belong to all three. 
Intraday data are collected from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database for all the 346 
stocks in the sample. Trade data consist of transactions coded as regular trades. Trades and 
quotes outside normal market hours (9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time) are excluded. 
The first trade in a trading day is deleted. Small trades transacted at the same price within a 
second are lumped into one trade. Quotes and trades are matched concurrently in our empirical 
estimation. That is, we pair each trade with the quote posted concurrently or earlier but within 
the same trading day. Quote data are used to sign the trade initiation variable (x). A trade at or 
above the ask price is classified as a buyer-initiated trade, and we assign 1 to the trade initiation 
variable. A trade at or below the bid price is classified as a seller-initiated trade, and we assign -1 
to the trade initiation variable. For a trade that crosses within the prevailing bid-ask spread, we 
assign 0 to the trade initiation variable. 
In addition to the intraday data, we collect daily stock prices from the CRSP tape for 
firms in the sample over the period from July 1, 1995 to December 31, 2000. These daily data 
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will be used later to perform event-study analysis to determine whether the firms in the testing 
samples are indeed politically sensitive firms. The period from July 1, 1995 to June, 2000 is the 
estimation period, over which we obtain the historical estimate of beta to control for the 
systematic risk in the calculation of abnormal returns. The period from July 1 to December 31 is 
the testing period, and it is further divided into four subperiods as the case for intraday data.  
 
3. Empirical methods 
3.1. Bid-ask spread components: Information and liquidity costs 
Transaction costs are measured by quoted and effective bid-ask spreads. Market 
microstructure theory suggests that transaction cost is a compensation for market making by 
specialists or dealers. Market makers face the problem of adverse selection and bear 
liquidity/inventory costs when they execute incoming buy and sell orders. Hence, the higher the 
information cost and/or the liquidity cost, the larger the quoted and effective bid-ask spreads. 
To understand the effect of presidential election on transaction costs, we estimate both 
the information and liquidity cost components of bid-ask spread by employing the quasi-
structural model of Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997, hereafter MRR). This model is a 
generalization of earlier microstructural models of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Stoll (1989). 
The MRR model is more structural because it accommodates unexpected public information and 
microstructural effects, and serial correlation in order flow. In the MRR model, the revision in 
beliefs is linked to the innovations in order flows and public information shocks. In addition to 
the informational impacts, the model incorporates the effect of stochastic rounding errors 
induced by price discreteness or time-varying returns. The following is a brief description of the 
MRR model. 
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Let Δpt be the transaction price change from time t-1 to t. θ is the parameter which 
measures the degree of information asymmetry or the permanent effect of order flow innovations 
on prices, and φ measures the transitory effect of order flow on prices. εt is the revision in beliefs 
due to new public information, and ξt is the effect of price rounding errors. Both εt and ξt are 
independent and identically distributed. In addition, denote xt as an indicator variable for trade 
initiation, where xt equals +1 if a trade is buyer initiated, -1 if it is seller initiated, and 0 if the 
trade crosses within the prevailing bid-ask spread. The variance of xt is normalized to one. Order 
flow (xt) may be serially correlated where ρ is the first-order autocorrelation. Given this setting, 
MRR show that price changes can be characterized by the following process: 
Δpt = (φ + θ)xt – (φ + ρθ)xt-1 + ut,     (1) 
where ut = εt + ξt - ξt-1, θ measures the extent of information asymmetry, and φ represents the 
compensation for liquidity provision and order process costs. φ captures the temporary effect of 
order flow on prices whereas θ captures the permanent effect associated with fundamental 
information. When order flow is autocorrelated, only the innovations reveal information. Hence, 
the autocorrelation parameter ρ can be used to determine the expectation and innovations of 
order flow. Based on (1), we can calculate the model-implied bid-ask spread (ISPR) as 
ISPR = 2(θ +φ).            (2) 
 We use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to estimate ρ, θ, and φ. The Newey 
and West (1987) procedure is adopted to account for the autocorrelation and conditional 
heteroskedasticity in observed price changes. In empirical investigation, we jointly estimate the 
model parameters by pooling the intraday data over the four subperiods from July 1 to December 
31, 2000 to increase estimation efficiency. This procedure allows the microstructural parameters 
to vary over the four subperiods. Specifically, the estimated model is  
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tiiiitiiit xIxIp θρφθφ . The first set of moment conditions defines 
the first-order autocorrelation in order flow. The second set of moment conditions requires that 
the mean of residuals in (1) to be zero. The third and fourth sets of conditions maintain that these 
residuals are independent from the trade initiation variables in current and lagged-one periods. 
3.2. Tests of cross-sectional variation in changes of bid-ask spreads 
To examine the transaction costs of stocks in relation to their spread components and 
stock features, we regress the change in bid-ask spread over two periods against changes in stock 
features, information cost, and liquidity cost for testing and controlling sample stocks. The 
testing model is 
ΔY = n0 + n1ΔP + n2ΔVOLA + n3ΔDV + n4Δθ + n5Δφ 
                     + D (s0 + s1ΔP + s2ΔVOLA + s3ΔDV + s4Δθ + s5Δφ),                (5) 
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where Y can be the quoted (SPR) or effective bid-ask spread (ESPR), P is the average close price, 
VOLA is the absolute daily change in the log of close price, DV is the daily dollar volume, θ is 
the information cost parameter, and φ is the liquidity cost parameter. Δ represents the log change 
in a variable. For example, from the base period to the polling period, ΔP is equal to the log price 
of the polling period minus the log price of the base period. Parameters n1, n2, n3, n4, and n5 are 
the coefficients of log changes in P, VOLA, DV, θ, and φ, respectively. D is a dummy variable, 
where D = 1 for testing sample firms and 0 for controlling sample firms. Parameter s0 represents 
the difference between the testing and controlling firms in the change of bid-ask spread, with the 
control of log changes in P, VOLA, DV, θ, and φ. Parameters s1, s2, s3, s4, and s5 represent the 
differences between the testing and controlling firms in the coefficients on changes in P, VOLA, 
DV, θ, and φ, respectively. We use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to estimate the 
parameters of the regression model in (5).  
3.3. Tests of the relation between spread and information cost using the portfolio approach 
 The above cross-sectional regression approach includes regressors (θ and φ) estimated 
from the MRR model. While the estimated coefficients of Δθ and Δφ are still unbiased, the 
estimated standard errors may be inconsistent (see Pagan, 1984). To resolve this problem, we 
employ a portfolio approach suggested by Daniel and Titman (1997) to test the relation between 
changes in spreads and changes in information and liquidity costs. Using this approach, we form 
bivariate portfolios based on Δθ and Δφ, and report the differences in spread changes associated 
with high and low Δθ (Δφ) groups. This enables us to examine the cross-sectional variation in 
spread changes over the election periods due to changes in information and noninformational 
(liquidity) cost components without a regression specification. This portfolio approach is thus 
robust to the generated regressor problem encountered in the cross-sectional regression. 
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3.4. Impacts of election news on stock returns 
 Intuitively, the Bush firms should experience positive returns and the Gore firms should 
have negative returns following the announcement of favorable news for Bush. Previous studies 
(see Cheng, 2005; Shon, 2006; and Knight, 2006) have documented this relation using either the 
polling or electronic market data. All of these studies have implicitly attributed the stock return 
to changes in expected future cash flows. However, strictly speaking, stock price changes can be 
due to either cash flow or discount rate changes.15 
 One way to separate the impacts of election news on cash flow and discount rate is to 
decompose the price change due to the news announcement into the components associated with 
these two variables. We can first estimate the change in discount rate in a period surrounding the 
event and then adjust the return for the change in the discount rate (or required return) for that 
period. The adjusted return should then reflect the change in cash flows. If this adjusted return is 
significantly positive surrounding the event, it would suggest that the election news impact the 
cash flow underlying the security favorably.   
To examine whether the discount rate of politically sensitive stocks changes over the 
election period, we estimate the following market model with dummy variables: 
tmtimtimtimtimtiiit RDRDRDRDRR εβββββα ++++++= 443322110 , (6) 
where jD , j =1, 2, 3, and 4, equals 1 if an observation falls into period j and zero, otherwise. i0β  
is the historical (base) beta for stock i and the beta for current period j is equal to jii ββ +0 . In 
empirical estimation, we use return data from July 1, 1995 to December 31, 2000. The historical 
period runs from July 1, 1995 to June 30, 2000. For this period, jD = 0 and the beta risk equals 
                                                 
15 This contrasts with Treasury coupon bonds where cash flow is fixed and virtually risk free, and so Treasury bond 
returns are predominantly associated with changes in discount rate (see Green, 2004). 
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to i0β . For any of the four election periods, the beta risk is equal to the historical beta i0β  plus an 
incremental beta ( jijD β ) for that period (j). If the beta risk changes over the election periods, it 
implies that the discount rate also changes. By accounting for the beta change in each period, we 
can provide a better picture whether the election news has an impact on the cash flow of 
politically sensitive firms.  
 For each stock in each election period j, we calculate the abnormal return for an 
individual stock in each day t as follows: 
mtjjiiiitit RDRAR )( 0 ββα +−−= . (7) 
The calculation of this abnormal return differs from the traditional event-study method which 
employs historical beta estimated from the data prior to the event window. Instead, we use the 
beta estimated for each period to capture the potential impacts of beta changes during the 2000 
presidential election period. Since returns are adjusted for the change in beta risk (and discount 
rate) associated with the election event, a significant abnormal return will imply that the return of 
the politically sensitive stock derives also from changes in the expected cash flow. That is, there 
is a significant stock price change over and beyond that is accounted by the change in the 
discount rate.  
 The cumulative abnormal return over the event window for each individual stock is 








where 1Tt −=  to 1T . In our empirical investigation, we set 31 =T  and t = 0 is the event day. The 
individual abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns are then averaged across firms to 
generate the average abnormal return and cumulative abnormal returns associated with a 
particular event: 

















= ∑ ,                                                               (10) 
where N is the number of stocks in a sample. In the empirical investigation, we focus on two 
clear-cut event days: the election date and the Supreme Court’s decision date to stop the Florida 
ballot recount. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Stock features and transaction costs 
We report the mean and standard deviation of stock features and bid-ask spreads for 
stocks in the partisan industry, top-donor, favored-firm, and controlling samples, respectively, in 
Panels A to D of Table 2. To examine the effects of presidential election on stock features and 
bid-ask spreads, we compare the log change in a variable over two periods for testing sample 
stocks with the log change in the same variable over the same two periods for controlling sample 
stocks by conducting the t tests and the Wilcoxon sign tests in Panels A, B, and C of Table 2. 
Each later period (the polling period, the election & recount period, or the post-recount period) is 
compared with the base period. The log change is defined as the log value of a variable in a later 
period minus the log value of a variable in the base period. The t-statistic is on the mean 
difference between the testing and controlling samples in the log change of a variable over two 
periods, and the Wilcoxon sign test statistic (z-score) is on the median difference between the 
two samples in the log change of a variable over two periods.  
Panel A of Table 2 summarizes stock characteristics and bid-ask spreads for 102 partisan 
industry stocks. We note that there are no significant differences in the log changes of variables 
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between the testing and controlling samples from the base period to the polling period, from the 
base period to the election & recount period, and from the base period to the post-recount 
period.16 
Panel B of Table 2 reports stock characteristics and bid-ask spreads for 19 top donor 
stocks. From the base period to the polling period, there are no significant differences in the log 
changes of variables between the testing and controlling samples, except for the number of trades 
and the quoted bid-ask spread in dollars. From the base period to the election & recount period, 
the differences between the testing and controlling samples in the log changes of bid-ask spreads 
are significant. The changes in effective spreads for the top donor firms are significantly higher 
than those of the controlling firms at the 5% level while the changes in quoted spreads are 
significant at the 10% level. From the base period to the post-recount period, all variables are 
insignificantly different except for the number of trades. 
Panel C of Table 2 reports stock features and bid-ask spreads for 32 favored-firm stocks. 
From the base period to the polling period, the log changes of favored firms are significantly 
different from those of controlling firms in stock price, market capitalization, effective bid-ask 
spreads in dollars and percentage, and quoted bid-ask spread in percentage, supported by both t-
statistics and z-scores.17 From the base period to the election & recount period, the log changes 
of favored firms are significantly different from those of controlling stocks in price, market 
capitalization, dollar volume, quoted spread in dollars and percentage, and effective spread in 
dollars. From the base period to the post-recount period, the log changes of favored firms are 
significantly different from those of controlling firms in stock price, market capitalization, and 
                                                 
16 Volume increases over these periods, though not significant. As shown later, higher volume increases liquidity 
and offsets the impact of information asymmetry on the bid ask spread. This may explain why changes in bid-ask 
spreads are insignificant here. 
17 The spread in percentage is the quoted (effective) bid-ask spread in dollars divided by the midquote. 
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quoted and effective spreads in dollars. The results show that in general favored firms are more 
sensitive to the election events than the firms in the other two categories (partisan industry and 
top donors). 
In summary, first, the price and market capitalization of favored firms go up significantly 
more than those of controlling stocks during the polling period, the election & recount period, 
and the post-recount period, respectively. Second, both quoted and effective bid-ask spreads of 
favored firms in percentage tend to decrease more than those of controlling stocks during the 
polling period. Decreases in percentage bid-ask spreads are attributable to increases in the price 
level. Third, both quoted and effective bid-ask spreads in dollars for top donors and favored 
firms increase more than those for the controlling stocks during the election & recount period. 
Therefore, the transaction costs of these firms’ stocks appear to be more sensitive to the election 
& recount activities. Furthermore, the bid-ask spreads (in dollars) of favored firms significantly 
increase during the polling and post-recount periods, suggesting that these firms are most 
sensitive to the election events. 
The results on stock features and bid-ask spreads of politically sensitive firms lead to a 
few questions as follows. Is any increase in transaction costs (measured by bid-ask spreads) 
merely a result of the changes in stock characteristics (such as price or market capitalization)? 
Do the news of election & recount and the various interpretations of the public news affect the 
asymmetric information of politically sensitive stocks? Is the increase in transaction costs related 
to any change in information cost? To answer these questions, we estimate the information and 
liquidity cost components of bid-ask spreads. We then decompose the dollar bid-ask spread into 
information and liquidity cost components for each stock, and examine the cross-sectional 
relation between changes in bid-ask spreads and changes in stock characteristics, information 
cost, and liquidity cost. 
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4.2. Response of returns to election news 
 Before we formally test the effects of information asymmetry on stock trading and bid-
ask spreads, we examine the response of prices for the stocks in the testing samples to election 
news. An important question is whether the firms included in the testing samples are in fact 
politically sensitive entities whose stock returns react positively (negatively) to favorable 
(unfavorable) election news. If this is the case, the next question is whether the election news 
announcement impacts cash flows or discount rates of these firms. In this section, we examine 
these two issues. 
 We perform the event analysis surrounding two important dates: November 7, 2000, the 
election day, and December 13, the day that the U.S. Supreme Court stopped the Florida recount. 
To examine whether returns of politically sensitive stocks are sensitive to the election news, we 
first estimate the abnormal returns for each stock using the traditional event-study method which 
assumes constant beta risk. Specifically, we estimate the beta risk using stock returns over a five-
year estimation period from July 1, 1995 to June 30, 2000 based on the following market model: 
tmtiiit RR εβα ++= . (11) 
The abnormal return (AR) for each stock in the event window is calculated as follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−= , (12) 
where iα̂  and iβ̂  are estimates from (11) using the historical data. Because we do not allow for 
the change in beta risk (and discount rate) in the event window, the abnormal returns in (12) may 
reflect changes in both expected cash flow and discount rate of the firm. We also calculate the 
cumulative abnormal return using the formula in (8). These individual abnormal returns and 
cumulative average abnormal returns are then averaged across firms to obtain the mean abnormal 
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return and cumulative abnormal returns. Following this, we calculate the abnormal and 
cumulative abnormal returns by allowing for changes in discount rate based on (6) and (7). 
Table 3 reports the abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns around 
two event dates (11/07/2000 and 12/13/2000), with constant betas in Panels A and B and 
changing betas in Panels C and D. We provide the results for the firms favored by the Bush 
platform only (B), by both the Bush and Gore platforms (B&G), and by the Gore platform only 
(G), as well as the results for all the testing firms.  
Panel A shows that the abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns are 
insignificant on the event day of November 7 for both the Bush-favored and Gore-favored firms. 
This finding can be attributed to the uncertain nature of the election outcome. Results suggest 
that the market was clouded with considerable uncertainty at that time. Panel B shows that the 
abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns are significantly positive for the 
Bush-favored firms and significantly negative for the Gore-favored firms on the event day of 
December 13 when Gore publicly conceded the presidency. The results show that the returns of 
politically sensitive firms are significantly affected by the final election outcome. 
The preceding event analysis primarily looks into the overall response of stock returns to 
the election news. We next examine whether the abnormal returns reflect the impacts of election 
news on firms’ cash flows. In this exercise, we estimate the modified market model in (6) and 
calculate the abnormal return by allowing for the effect of beta changes on returns in both event 
periods (see (7)). Beta changes significantly in the base, polling, and election & recount periods, 
indicating that the discount rate changes over these periods.18  
Panel C of Table 3 reports the abnormal returns surrounding November 7 after 
accounting for the changes in betas. We note that in general the uncertain outcome on the 
                                                 
18 We estimated beta for each period and each subsample. For the interest of brevity, the results are not reported here. 
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election date has no significant effect on the returns of either the Gore-favored or Bush-favored 
firms. Panel D of Table 3 reports the results surrounding December 13, 2000. In contrast to the 
results surrounding November 7, we see a clearer pattern for the stock price response to the news 
even after controlling for the effect of changes in discount rates. The abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns on event day 0 are significantly positive for Bush-favored firms. 
The abnormal returns on event day 0 are significantly negative for Gore-favored firm. Since the 
abnormal returns are calculated by accounting for the change in beta during the election period, 
these abnormal returns are already adjusted for the impact of election news on discount rates. 
The significantly positive abnormal returns for Bush-favored firms thus suggest that the election 
news announcement impacts the expected cash flow of politically sensitive firms.19  
4.3. Information and liquidity costs 
Table 4 reports estimates of information cost and other parameters of the MRR model for 
firms in the entire sample as well as in each category. Panel A reports the results for all testing 
firms under the Bush/Gore political platforms and the controlling firms. Estimates of the first-
order autocorrelation of order flow (ρ), the information cost parameter (θ), and the liquidity cost 
parameter (φ) are all highly significant, and the standard errors are quite small. Results indicate 
that the MRR model fits the transaction data of the firms in the testing and controlling samples 
very well. The implied bid-ask spread (ISPR=2θ+2φ) and the proportion of information cost out 
of bid-ask spread (θ/(θ+φ)) are calculated based on the estimated parameters. 
As shown in Panel A, from the base period to the polling period, the log changes of 
politically sensitive stocks are insignificantly different from those of controlling stocks in the 
first-order autocorrelation of order flow, the liquidity cost parameter, and the model-implied bid-
                                                 
19 We also estimated results for each group.  The results exhibit the same pattern as that of the entire sample.  
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ask spread in dollars. Changes in θ and the proportion of information cost out of bid-ask spread 
for the politically sensitive stocks are larger than those for the controlling stocks but only 
significant at the 10% level. From the base period to the election & recount period, the log 
changes of politically sensitive firms are significantly different from those of controlling stocks 
in the information cost parameter, and the proportion of information cost out of bid-ask spread. 
From the base period to the post-recount period, the changes of politically sensitive firms are 
significantly different from those of controlling firms in the information and liquidity cost 
parameters, and the proportion of information cost out of bid-ask spread. 
Panels B to D report the results for each subsample. Panel B shows that the difference 
between the partisan industry firms and controlling firms is significant only at the 10% 
significance level for the information cost change from the base period to the election & recount 
period. The difference in the proportions of information cost out of bid-ask spread between the 
two groups are significant at the 5% level. In addition, the differences in both the information 
cost and the proportion of information cost out of bid-ask spread are significant at the 5% level 
from the base period to the post-recount period.   
Panel C reports the results for the top donor firms. Similar to the results for the entire 
sample in Panel A, changes in the information cost and the proportion of information cost out of 
bid-ask spread for the top-donor firms are significantly higher than those of the controlling firms 
at the 5% level from the base period to the election & recount period. By contrast, the change in 
the liquidity cost parameter for the top-donor group is significantly lower than that of the 
controlling firms.  
Panel D reports the results for the favored-firm sample. The changes in the information 
cost and its proportion out of bid-ask spread for this group relative to the controlling firms are 
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more significant than those for the entire sample in panel A. In addition, the implied spread 
estimates (ISPR) are significantly higher for the favored firm group for all three periods. 
In summary, it appears that the events in the 2000 election have affected the information 
cost and the proportion of information cost out of bid-ask spread for politically sensitive firms. 
These effects are stronger during the election & recount period and the post-recount period. On 
the other hand, the liquidity cost decreases in the election & recount and post-recount periods as 
trading volume increases, though the impact of election events on liquidity cost is not as 
significant as that on the information cost. In general, the effects of the election events are more 
clearly manifested by the favored-firm sample, followed by top donors and partisan industry 
firms. Overall, the unusual delay in election outcome causes higher information cost and a higher 
proportion of information cost out of bid-ask spread for most politically sensitive firms. With the 
estimates of information and liquidity costs, we are ready to examine the cross-sectional changes 
in bid-ask spreads against the changes in information cost, liquidity cost, and stock features for 
firms in the testing and controlling samples. 
4.4. Tests of changes in bid-ask spreads 
We estimate the cross-sectional regression model in (5) for each period, i.e., from the 
base period to the polling period, the election & recount period, and the post-recount period, 
respectively.20 Table 5 reports the results of cross-sectional regression of log changes in bid-ask 
spreads against log changes in stock characteristics, and information and liquidity costs. Panel A 
shows results on quoted bid-ask spreads, while Panel B provides results on effective bid-ask 
spreads. We first note that in general the cross-sectional variation of changes in bid-ask spreads 
                                                 
20 We tested the correlation of changes in variables for a combination of 123 politically sensitive firms and 223 
controlling firms. The correlations among the log changes in price, volatility, dollar volume, information cost 
parameter, and liquidity cost parameter are low. We do not include market capitalization, share volume, and number 
of trades because they are highly correlated with other variables. For the interest of brevity, the results are not 
reported here. 
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is positively and significantly related to changes in price, volatility, and liquidity cost (in periods 
II and III) and negatively related to dollar volume. More importantly, the change in bid-ask 
spreads is significantly related to the change in information cost, even with the control of stock 
characteristics. Second, parameter s0 is insignificant at the 5% level, indicating that controlling 
for changes in stock characteristics, information cost, and liquidity cost, there is no longer any 
difference in the change of bid-ask spreads between the testing and controlling firms. Third, 
there is no significant difference between the testing and controlling firms in the sensitivity of 
spreads to changes in the information cost, liquidity cost, and stock characteristic variables. 
Overall, results show that controlling for the effects of stock characteristics and the liquidity cost, 
changes in bid-ask spreads are explained by changes in the information cost. Thus, the increase 
in bid-ask spreads is not merely a result of the increase in stock price or changes in other stock 
characteristics. These findings are consistent with the contention that the uncertainty in the 2000 
presidential race and the unusual delay in election outcome cause higher information cost, which 
exerts a pressure on the bid-ask spreads for politically sensitive firms. 
4.5. Robustness check 
4.5.1. The instrumental variable approach 
 The cross-sectional regression above relies upon the parameters θ and φ estimated from 
the time-series MRR model to determine whether bid-ask spread changes are significantly 
related to information and liquidity costs. Since this two-step procedure involves the generated 
regressors, it may cause an error-in-variable problem in parameter estimation, leading to 
inconsistency and inefficiency in regression tests. This two-step estimation problem is quite 
common in asset pricing tests which employ systematic risk estimates (betas) as explanatory 
variables. The standard approach to overcome this problem is to form portfolios and perform 
rolling regression tests (e.g., Fama and MacBeth, 1973; Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979). 
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However, in the present case, our choice is limited by the length of the sample period and 
number of firms in our sample due to the unique nature of the election event. Therefore, we 
adopt the instrumental variable approach suggested by Easley et al. (2002) instead. In this 
approach, the solution to the error-in-variable problem is to create an instrumental variable. The 
implementation procedure is as follows. We first rank all firms in the testing and controlling 
samples by θ and divide them into 10 portfolios in each sample.21 We calculate the average θ for 
each portfolio, Ptheta, and this variable is then assigned to each individual stock in the portfolio 
as an instrumental variable for θ. This instrumental variable (Ptheta) mitigates the error-in-
variable problem caused by the two-step estimation, and yet it is closely related to θ. Finally, we 
run the cross-sectional regression of spread changes using both Δθ and ΔPtheta. If there is a 
serious error-in-variable problem and the instrumental variable Ptheta resolves it, then the 
coefficient of ΔPtheta will be significant while the coefficient of Δθ will be close to zero. 
Conversely, if there is no error-in-variable problem, the coefficient of ΔPtheta will be close to 
zero and the coefficient of Δθ will not be significantly affected by the inclusion of ΔPtheta in the 
regression. In this way, we can detect whether the cross-sectional relationship between the 
spread and θ changes in Table 5 is spurious due to the two-step estimation procedure. 
Table 6 provides the results of two different tests, using the instrumental variable Ptheta. 
In Test 1, we replace Δθ with ΔPtheta as the information cost variable in the cross-sectional 
regression. The results show that ΔPtheta is significant at the 5% level in both quoted and 
effective spread regressions. In addition, the coefficient of ΔPtheta is very close to the coefficient 
of Δθ in Table 5. This finding suggests that ΔPtheta is an effective instrumental variable for Δθ. 
                                                 
21 There are 12 or 13 stocks in each portfolio for the testing sample, and 22 or 23 stocks in each portfolio for the 
controlling sample. In the testing sample, there are three portfolios with 13 stocks. In the controlling sample, there 
are three portfolios with 23 stocks. 
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However, the t-values and R2 decrease, indicating that while it may correct the error-in-variable 
problem, some information is lost in using ΔPtheta as a proxy variable. In Test 2, we conduct 
cross-sectional regressions using both Δθ and ΔPtheta as the explanatory variables for the change 
in the information cost. Results show that the coefficient of Δθ remains highly significant while 
the coefficient of ΔPtheta becomes insignificant. Moreover, the coefficient of ΔPtheta is close to 
zero whereas the coefficient of Δθ remains close to the results of the regression excluding 
ΔPtheta. These findings strongly suggest that the error-in-variable problem associated with the 
information cost parameter is not a serious concern in the cross-sectional spread change 
regression. 
4.5.2. The portfolio approach 
 The portfolio approach provides another tool which is robust to the error-in-variable 
problem. This approach is used extensively in the finance literature (see for example, Daniel and 
Titman, 1997; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Gebhardt et al., 2005). The portfolio approach 
allows us to analyze the cross-sectional variation in bid-ask spread changes associated with the 
information cost change while isolating the influence of the change in the liquidity or non-
information cost. Using this portfolio approach, we form portfolios to assess the effect of the 
information cost on bid-ask spreads over the four periods in the 2000 presidential election. 
  Table 7 reports the results of the bivariate portfolio analysis on spread changes. Stocks in 
both testing and controlling samples are first sorted independently into three Δθ portfolios (high, 
median, and low) and two Δφ portfolios (high and low) based on the fact that the information 
cost has a stronger role in bid-ask spreads than the liquidity cost. This creates six portfolios in the 
intersection of Δθ and Δφ. We then calculate the average spread change for each portfolio 
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between the base period and any of the later three periods (polling, election & recount, and post 
recount).  
Panel A reports the results of spread changes for the bivariate portfolios formed from the 
123 politically sensitive firms. All variables (ΔSPR, ΔESPR, Δθ, and Δφ) are expressed in log 
changes. The figures in each column are the spread changes corresponding to low, middle, and 
high Δθ groups given a level of the liquidity cost change (Δφ). The figures in each row are the 
spread changes corresponding to low and high Δφ groups given the information cost change (Δθ). 
Results show that controlling for the effect of the liquidity cost change (Δφ), spread changes 
increase monotonically as the information cost change (Δθ) increases. Similarly, controlling for 
the effect of Δθ, the spread change increases as Δφ increases. Thus, there is clear evidence of a 
positive relationship between spread changes and the information and liquidity cost changes for 
the politically sensitive firms. 
 Panel B reports the results of spread changes for the bivariate portfolios constructed from 
the 223 controlling firms. Results again show that after controlling for the effect of the liquidity 
cost change (Δφ), spread changes increase monotonically as Δθ increases. Likewise, controlling 
for the effect of the information cost change (Δθ), we find that spread changes increase with Δφ. 
Once more, these findings are consistent with the prediction of microstructure theory. 
 We next analyze the difference in the spreads between testing and controlling firms. If 
the uncertainty in the 2000 election causes greater information asymmetry for politically 
sensitive stocks, the change in the information cost will be greater for testing firms than for 
controlling firms. This in turn will cause the change in bid-ask spread over the period of the 
election to be greater for politically sensitive firms, other things being equal. To test this 
hypothesis, we first sort the controlling firms into 6 controlling portfolios similar to Panel B by 
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Δθ and Δφ, and calculate the mean values of Δθ and Δφ for each portfolio. These mean changes 
in the information and liquidity costs for the controlling firms serve as the benchmark values. We 
then sort the 123 firms in the testing sample into 6 testing portfolios similar to the procedure in 
Panel A. For each firm in each of the 6 portfolios, we calculate the difference between the testing 
firm’s Δθ (or Δφ) and the mean value of Δθ (or Δφ) of the corresponding benchmark portfolio. 
For example, if a testing firm is classified in portfolio 1 with low Δθ and Δφ, we subtract the 
firm’s Δθ from the mean value of Δθ associated with controlling (benchmark) portfolio 1. 
Similarly, we calculate the differences in log spread changes and Δφ between the testing firm and 
the benchmark portfolio. This procedure is repeated for all firms in the testing sample. Finally, 
we sort the 123 firms in the testing sample into 3 x 2 portfolios by the differences in Δθ and Δφ 
between the testing firm and the benchmark portfolio (of the controlling firms), that is, by 
)( CT θθ Δ−Δ  and )( CT φφ Δ−Δ  where the superscripts T and C represent the testing firm and 
the control (benchmark) portfolio, respectively. We report the average difference in log spread 
changes between the testing firm and the benchmark portfolio in Panel C of Table 7 for each 
portfolio. 
 The first two columns in each period in Panel C show the differences in spread changes 
between the testing and controlling firms for the low, middle, and high )( CT θθ Δ−Δ  groups 
given a level of )( CT φφ Δ−Δ . The differences in spread changes between high and low 
)( CT θθ Δ−Δ groups are reported in the bottom row for each period. The first three rows of each 
spread category (quoted or effective) in each period show the differences in spread changes for 
low and high )( CT φφ Δ−Δ  groups given a level of )( CT θθ Δ−Δ . The differences in spread 
changes between high and low )( CT φφ Δ−Δ  groups are reported in the third column of each 
spread category (SPR and ESPR) for each period.   
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Consistent with the prediction, we find that the difference in spread changes generally 
increases as the difference in the information cost )( CT θθ Δ−Δ  increases, holding the difference 
in the liquidity cost )( CT φφ Δ−Δ  constant. Similarly, the difference in spread changes increases 
as the difference in liquidity cost )( CT φφ Δ−Δ  increases, holding the difference in the 
information cost )( CT θθ Δ−Δ  constant. Conditional on the value of )( CT φφ Δ−Δ , the 
differences in the bid-ask spreads between the high and low )( CT θθ Δ−Δ  groups are 
significantly positive at the 5% level from the base period (I) to the polling period (II), and to the 
election & recount period (III). The differences between the high and low )( CT θθ Δ−Δ  groups 
are also positive from the base period to the post-recount period (IV) but are only significant at 
the 10% level for the case associated with quoted spread. Similar results for the spread changes 
due to liquidity cost changes are found. The differences in spreads between high and low 
)( CT φφ Δ−Δ  groups are positive, though somewhat less significant. Overall, the results are 
consistent with the findings in the regression analyses, suggesting that the information cost 
increases during the election periods and these increases have positive impacts on spread 
changes of the politically sensitive stocks. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the information and non-information cost components of stock 
trading at the intraday level during the 2000 presidential election. Our results show that the 
information cost of the politically sensitive firms under the Bush/Gore platforms is affected by 
the delay in election outcome. 
 In a typical presidential election, the uncertainty about the election outcome, if there is 
any, is usually resolved by the end of the election day or by the next day. During the 2000 
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presidential election, however, the uncertainty about the election outcome lasts for about 36 days. 
The unusual delay in election outcome may lead to various interpretations of public information 
and induce an information disparity. The politically sensitive stocks under the Bush/Gore 
platform tend to be affected by this information disparity during the election & recount period. 
Consistent with this view, we find that information asymmetry increases over the election period. 
The politically sensitive stocks are explicitly exposed to the attention of investors and traders, 
and their future financial performances are directly linked to the election outcome. When the 
election outcome is delayed unusually, it leads to differential interpretations regarding the 
performances of these stocks, and speculators trade based on their own private information or 
superior forecast. As a consequence, market makers would incur higher information cost in 
executing buy and sell orders of these stocks.  
 We find that the information cost increases, particularly during the election & recount 
period, for most politically sensitive stocks. At the same time, the liquidity cost for the politically 
sensitive stocks declines relative to the stocks in the controlling sample. The decrease in the 
liquidity partially offsets the increase in the information cost for the politically sensitive stocks. 
The net increase in bid-ask spread depends on the relative strength of these two components in 
different periods and testing samples. More importantly, we find that cross-sectional variations in 
the spread changes are significantly related to changes in stock price, volatility, dollar volume, 
and the information and liquidity costs. Our finding supports the contention that the uncertainty 
in the 2000 presidential election causes informational asymmetry for politically sensitive stocks 
and increases their information cost of trading and price volatility. These changes in turn exert a 
pressure on bid-ask spreads during this period. 
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Testing Samples. This table provides a list of 123 stocks in three testing samples. The three testing samples 
are: partisan contributing industries, top partisan donors, and favored firms under the Bush/Gore political 
platforms. “X” indicates that a stock belongs to a specific sample category. “B” indicates Bush and “G” 
indicates Gore partisan firms. 
 















(123) (102) (19) (32)   (123) (102) (19) (32)  
AA X   B  FNM X  X B/G* 
ABT X   B  FO X   G 
AET   X B  FRE X X X B/G* 
AGC   X G  GD X  X B 
AHC X   B  GE X X  B 
AN X   B  GLK X   B 
AL X   B  GM X   B 
APA X   B  GP X  X B 
APC X   B  GT X   B 
APD X   B  HAL X   B 
ASH X   B  HAS X   G 
ATI X   B  HDI X   G 
AW X   G  HI   X B 
BA X  X B  HIG   X G 
BCC X   B  HM X   B 
BHI X  X B  HPC X   B 
BLS  X  B  HRB   X G 
BMY X  X B  IFF X   B 
CAG X   B  IP X X  B 
CAT X   B  ITT X   B 
CB   X G  JCI X   B 
CCE X   B  JNJ X   B 
CCR X   B  KBH X   B 
CCU X   G  KMG X   B 
CHV X   B  LEG X   B 
COF X   B  LEH X   B 
COP X   B  LLL X   B 
CTX X   B  LLY X X X B 
DE   X G  LMT X   B 
DIS X X  G  LNC   X G 
DOW X   B  LPX X   B 
DYN X   B  LTR X  X B 
EC X   B  MAS X   B 
EK X   G  MBI   X B 
EMN X   B  MEA X   B 
ENE  X  B  MET  X  G 
EPG X  X B  MO X X X B 
FBF  X X G  MRK X  X B 
FCX X   B  MRO X   B 
FLR X   B  MWD  X  B 
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Table 1 continued. 
 















(123) (102) (19) (32)   (123) (102) (19) (32)  
NE X   B  SLM   X B 
NEM X   B  SO  X  B 
NOC X  X B  SUN X   B 
NUE X   B  SWK X   B 
ONE  X X B/G*  TOS X   B 
OXY X   B  TX X   B 
P X   B  TYC X   B 
PCH X   B  UCL X   B 
PCL X   B  UNP X X  B 
PD X   B  UST X X  B 
PDG X   B  UTX X   B 
PFE X X X B  W X   B 
PHA X X X B  WLL X   B 
PHM X   B  WLP   X B 
PX X   B  WMB X   B 
Q  X  B  WMI X   G 
RD X   B  WOR X   B 
RDC X   B  WPI   X G 
RIG X   B  WY X  X B 
ROH X   B  X X   B 
SBC   X B  XOM X X  B 
SGP X  X B       
 
*FNM is a Bush-partisan industry stock, but a favored firm under the Gore platform. FRE is a Bush-partisan 
industry stock and a Bush-partisan top donor, but a favored firm under the Gore platform. ONE is Bush-
partisan top donor, but a favored firm under the Gore platform.  




Stock Features and Bid-Ask Spreads. This table provides statistics on the features of 102 partisan 
contributing industry stocks in Panel A, 19 top-donor firms in Panel B, 32 favored firms under the Bush/Gore 
political platforms in Panel C, and 223 controlling stocks in Panel D. Period I (the base period) is from 
7/1/2000 to 8/31/2000, Period II (the polling period) is from 9/1/2000 to 11/6/2000, Period III (the election & 
recount period) is from 11/7/2000 to 12/13/2000, and Period IV (the post-recount period) is from 12/14/2000 
to 12/31/2000. P is the close price, MV is the market capitalization, V is the daily share volume, DV is the 
daily dollar volume, T is the daily number of trades, VOLA is the absolute daily change in the log of close 
price, SPR ($) is the quoted bid-ask spread in dollars, ESPR ($) is the effective bid-ask spread in dollars, SPR 
(%) is the quoted bid-ask spread in percentage, and ESPR (%) is the effective bid-ask spread in percentage. 
The t-statistic is on the mean difference between one of the testing samples and the controlling sample in the 
log change of a variable from Period I to Period II (III or IV), and the Wilcoxon sign test statistic (z-score) is 
on the median difference between the two samples in the log change of a variable from Period I to Period II 
(III or IV). * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
Panel A. Partisan Industry Stocks (102) 
  Period I Period II t-valuez-score Period III 
t-value
z-score Period IV 
t-value 
z-score 
P Mean 39.12 40.54 t=0.06 40.79 t=-0.35 42.21 t=0.57 
($) Std. Dev. 21.63 22.47 z=-0.56 21.54 z=-0.89 22.13 z=-0.34 
MV Mean 29,421,198 27,842,007 t=0.06 31,407,979 t=-0.35 31,579,765 t=0.57 
($1000) Std. Dev. 74,893,341 72,374,158 z=-0.56 77,117,403 z=-0.89 74,736,885 z=0.34 
V Mean 1,363,058 1,689,041 t=0.18 1,653,497 t=1.06 1,695,040 t=0.64 
 Std. Dev. 1579571 1952307 z=-0.05 1937377 z=0.72 1,955,548 z=0.70 
DV Mean 64,599,385 78,904,922 t=0.17 80,889,880 t=0.66 83,601,096 t=0.76 
($1000) Std. Dev. 89,251,172 107,757,925 z=0.68 113,506,129 z=-0.11 112,142,584 z=0.47 
T Mean 565 670.09 t=-0.28 705 t=-0.10 752 t=0.27 
 Std. Dev. 487 557.49 z=-0.05 537 z=-0.76 544 z=-0.01 
VOLA Mean 0.0326 0.0206 t=-1.09 0.0202 t=0.25 0.0238 t=0.76 
 Std. Dev. 0.0136 0.0077 z=-1.11 0.0069 z=0.17 0.0089 z=0.68 
SPR Mean 0.1135 0.1152 t=0.11 0.1152 t=-0.92 0.1167 t=0.02 
($) Std. Dev. 0.0262 0.0277 z=-1.25 0.0236 z=-1.20 0.0265 z=-0.23 
ESPR Mean 0.0875 0.0881 t=-1.13 0.0867 t=-1.82 0.0893 t=-0.31 
($) Std. Dev. 0.0184 0.0178 z=-0.20 0.0133 z=-1.61 0.0162 z=0.09 
SPR Mean 0.39% 0.40% t=-0.06 0.39% t=-0.07 0.39% t=-0.57 
(%) Std. Dev. 0.27% 0.30% z=0.32 0.31% z=-0.03 0.31% z=-0.05 
ESPR Mean 0.30% 0.31% t=-0.25 0.31% t=-0.35 0.30% t=-0.69 
(%) Std. Dev. 0.19% 0.22% z=0.11 0.26% z=0.01 0.23% z=0.18 
Panel B. Top Donor Stocks (19) 
P Mean 48.03 49.04 t=-0.73 49.03 t=0.43 50.37 t=0.76 
($) Std. Dev. 23.12 21.40 z=-0.37 20.01 z=0.04 19.81 z=0.10 
MV Mean 96,589,039 99,570,603 t=-0.73 97,181,472 t=0.43 96,254,630 t=0.76 
($1000) Std. Dev. 145,804,334 152,581,500 z=-0.37 143,987,939 z=0.04 136,116,966 z=0.10 
V Mean 3,314,400 3,868,724 t=-1.92 4,122,646 t=0.66 4,092,344 t=-0.59 
 Std. Dev. 2,382,843 2,956,226 z=-1.73 2,917,055 z=0.63 3,095,498 z=-0.38 
DV Mean 166,263,348 200,778,034 t=-1.85 203,991,650 t=0.76 205,432,346 t=-0.10 
($1000) Std. Dev. 132,203,284 174,078,487 z=-1.41 153,791,070 z=0.42 160,709,691 z=-0.01 
T Mean 1,090 1,190 t=-2.45* 1,235 t=-2.71* 1,282 t=-3.73* 
 Std. Dev. 676 697 z=-3.35* 665 z=-2.56* 692 z=-3.04* 
VOLA Mean 0.029 0.020 t=-0.02 0.021 t=1.28 0.021 t=0.02 
 Std. Dev. 0.011 0.005 z=0.05 0.006 z=1.25 0.009 z=0.14 
SPR Mean 0.1042 0.1062 t=2.10* 0.1089 t=1.71 0.1057 t=-0.01 
($) Std. Dev. 0.0154 0.0159 z=1.93 0.0182 z=1.14 0.0191 z=-0.23 
ESPR Mean 0.0827 0.0846 t=1.32 0.0873 t=2.95* 0.0850 t=0.84 
($) Std. Dev. 0.0106 0.0121 z=1.16 0.0126 z=2.34* 0.0119 z=0.48 
SPR Mean 0.26% 0.25% t=1.45 0.25% t=0.13 0.23% t=-0.80 
(%) Std. Dev. 0.12% 0.10% z=0.97 0.09% z=0.00 0.07% z=-0.35 
ESPR Mean 0.21% 0.20% t=-1.03 0.20% t=0.67 0.19% t=-0.58 
(%) Std. Dev. 0.09% 0.07% z=-0.83 0.07% z=0.62 0.06% z=-0.08 
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Table 2 continued. 
 
Panel C. Favored Stocks (32) 
  Period I Period II t-valuez-score Period III 
t-value
z-score Period IV 
t-value 
z-score 
P Mean 52.30 56.99 t=2.86* 60.83 t=3.75* 62.05 t=3.09* 
($) Std. Dev. 15.95 18.14 z=3.07* 20.35 z=2.57* 20.77 z=2.22* 
MV Mean 39,966,572 42,800,724 t=2.86* 47,365,763 t=3.75* 48,812,850 t=3.09* 
($1000) Std. Dev. 52,755,063 54,634,668 z=3.07* 62,428,582 z=2.57* 64,136,717 z=2.22* 
V Mean 2,031,062 2,385,772 t=-0.44 2,404,341 t=0.84 2,397,894 t=-0.74 
 Std. Dev. 1,962,385 2,185,451 z=-0.47 2,279,669 z=0.47 2,365,315 z=-0.46 
DV Mean 99,729,871 126,024,282 t=0.68 137,144,602 t=2.48* 136,859,629 t=0.91 
($1000) Std. Dev. 96,846,538 109,932,123 z=1.28 127,759,843 z=1.51 125,015,636 z=0.94 
T Mean 739 891 t=-0.53 970 t=0.43 970 t=-1.56 
 Std. Dev. 457 518 z=-0.24 560 z=-0.12 534 z=-1.50 
VOLA Mean 0.032 0.020 t=-0.98 0.019 t=-0.32 0.022 t=-0.52 
 Std. Dev. 0.013 0.004 z=-0.72 0.005 z=-0.18 0.016 z=-0.86 
SPR Mean 0.1230 0.1263 t=0.99 0.1322 t=2.84* 0.1311 t=2.30* 
($) Std. Dev. 0.0270 0.0303 z=1.39 0.0344 z=2.32* 0.0256 z=1.72 
ESPR Mean 0.0926 0.0967 t=2.88* 0.0989 t=3.51* 0.0993 t=3.26* 
($) Std. Dev. 0.0159 0.0191 z=2.67* 0.0212 z=3.03* 0.0206 z=2.58* 
SPR Mean 0.25% 0.24% t=-2.88* 0.23% t=-2.10* 0.23% t=-1.88 
(%) Std. Dev. 0.05% 0.06% z=-2.41* 0.06% z=-1.62 0.07% z=-1.80 
ESPR Mean 0.19% 0.18% t=-2.50* 0.18% t=-1.76 0.17% t=-1.75 
(%) Std. Dev. 0.04% 0.05% z=-2.23* 0.05% z=-1.25 0.05% z=-1.58 
 
Panel D. Controlling Stocks (223) 
  Period I Period II Period III Period IV 
P Mean 38.81 39.18 40.46 41.11 
($) Std. Dev. 20.80 22.14 22.38 23.16 
MV Mean 15,421,491 15,463,375 15,632,659 15,705,457
($1000) Std. Dev. 31,472,029 30,457,286 29,655,730 28,712,937
V Mean 1,005,762 1,199,727 1,196,120 1,275,822 
 Std. Dev. 1,030,231 1,281,488 1,369,705 1,509,490 
DV Mean 42,567,151 52,107,581 52,911,854 53,785,298
($1000) Std. Dev. 64,443,866 85,379,940 87,855,210 89,166,637
T Mean 446 533 574 608 
 Std. Dev. 369 419 432 434 
VOLA Mean 0.0323 0.0213 0.0203 0.0228 
 Std. Dev. 0.0144 0.0078 0.0104 0.0106 
SPR Mean 0.1233 0.1228 0.1250 0.1245 
($) Std. Dev. 0.0310 0.0308 0.0319 0.0308 
ESPR Mean 0.0916 0.0922 0.0920 0.0927 
($) Std. Dev. 0.0186 0.0188 0.0202 0.0182 
 Median 0.0880 0.0891 0.0883 0.0903 
SPR Mean 0.40% 0.39% 0.39% 0.39% 
(%) Std. Dev. 0.21% 0.20% 0.21% 0.24% 
ESPR Mean 0.30% 0.30% 0.29% 0.30% 
(%) Std. Dev. 0.18% 0.17% 0.18% 0.20% 
 




The Impact of Election News on Stock Returns and Cash Flows. Panels A and B examine the impact of 
election news on stock returns. They report the abnormal returns for 123 politically sensitive firms and 
subgroups surrounding the event days of November 7, 2000 and December 13, 2000 under the assumption 
that beta does not change during the period. The beta is estimated using five-year daily return data before 
07/01/2000. Panels C and D examine the impact of election news on cash flows. They reports the abnormal 
returns for 123 politically sensitive firms and subgroups surrounding the event days of November 7, 2000 
and December 13, 2000, by accounting for the changes in betas during the period. AR is the abnormal return. 
CAR is the cumulated average abnormal return. Subgroups B(·) and G(·) represent the number of firms in 
favor of Bush and Gore, respectively. * indicates the 5% significance level. 
 
Event day B(103) B&G(3) G(17) All Firms (123) 
 AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR 
Panel A. Abnormal Returns with Constant Betas around 11/07/2000 
-3 0.4027 0.4027 1.0896 1.0896 0.6512 0.6512 0.4538 0.4538 
-2 -1.0320* -0.6293* -2.9770 -1.8874 -0.0970 0.5542 -0.9500* -0.4962
-1 0.1514 -0.4779 -0.8540 -2.7414 -0.5000 0.0542 0.0369 -0.4593
0 0.3162 -0.1617 1.8597* -0.8817 0.0956 0.1498 0.3234 -0.1359
1 0.0800 -0.0817 -2.7460* -3.6277 0.8215 0.9713 0.1136 -0.0223
2 1.4439* 1.3622* 2.1265 -1.5012 2.4872* 3.4585 1.6047* 1.5824*
3 -0.4350* 0.9272* 3.8304 2.3292 0.4866 3.9451 -0.2030 1.3794*
Panel B. Abnormal Returns with Constant Betas around 12/13/2000 
-3 -0.1460 -0.1460 -0.9930 -0.9930 -0.3210 -0.3210 -0.1910 -0.1910
-2 0.1204 -0.0256 0.9393 -0.0537 -2.0310* -2.3520* -0.1590 -0.3500
-1 0.4715* 0.4459 0.0995 0.0458 0.6433 -1.7087 0.4863* 0.1363 
0 0.5833* 1.0292* 0.3143 0.3601 -1.4530* -3.1617* 0.2930 0.4293 
1 -0.7860* 0.2432 1.1485 1.5086 0.4531 -2.7086* -0.5650* -0.1357
2 0.5382* 0.7814 3.2606 4.7692 0.9382* -1.7704 0.6609* 0.5252 
3 1.6839* 2.4653* 3.2637 8.0329 1.2055* -0.5649 1.6561* 2.1813*
Panel C. Abnormal Returns with Changing Betas around 11/07/2000 
-3 0.1686 0.1686 1.0412 1.0412 0.7012 0.7012 0.2635 0.2635 
-2 -0.8210* -0.3260* -2.9200 -0.9390 -0.1390 0.2812 -0.7780* -0.2570 
-1 0.1076 -0.1820 -0.8570 -0.9120 -0.4890 0.0244 0.0016 -0.1710 
0 0.3088 -0.0590 1.8497* -0.2220 0.0982 0.0429 0.3173 -0.0490 
1 0.0788 -0.0310 -2.7550* -0.7280 0.8171 0.1977 0.1117 -0.0170 
2 1.1053* 0.1580* 0.9726 -0.4450 2.0752* 0.5106 1.2362* 0.1920* 
3 -0.5720* 0.0538 3.3605 0.0988 0.3207 0.4835 -0.3520 0.1143 
Panel D. Abnormal Returns with Changing Betas around 12/13/2000 
-3 0.3396 0.3396 0.4583 0.4583 0.1922 0.1922 0.3220 0.3220 
-2 0.2883 0.3139 1.5010 0.9797* -1.8340* -0.8210 0.0224 0.1722 
-1 0.3336 0.3205* -0.3740 0.5284 0.4731 -0.3890 0.3356 0.2267 
0 0.6104* 0.3930* 0.3590 0.4861 -1.4500* -0.6550 0.3171 0.2493* 
1 -0.6280* 0.1888* 0.0859* 0.4060 0.5883 -0.4060 -0.4410* 0.1113 
2 0.8286* 0.2954* 1.6291* 0.6099 1.1449* -0.1480 0.8924* 0.2414* 
3 1.7940* 0.5095* 3.8877 1.0781* 1.1992* 0.0448 1.7626* 0.4588* 
 




Estimates of Information Cost and Other Parameters. This table reports estimates of information cost and other parameters for 123 politically sensitive stocks and 
223 controlling stocks. Period I (the base period) is from 7/1/2000 to 8/31/2000, Period II (the polling period) is from 9/1/2000 to 11/6/2000, Period III (the 
election & recount period) is from 11/7/2000 to 12/13/2000, and Period IV (the post-recount period) is from 12/14/2000 to 12/31/2000. ρ is the first-order 
autocorrelation of order flow, θ is the information cost parameter, and φ is the liquidity cost parameter. ISPR ($) is the model-implied bid-ask spread in dollars, 
and it is equal to 2(θ+φ). θ/(θ+φ) is the proportion of information cost out of the bid-ask spread. The t-statistic is on the mean difference between the testing and 
controlling samples in the log change of a parameter from Period I to Period II (III or IV), and the Wilcoxon sign test statistic (z-score) is on the median 
difference between the two samples in the log change of a parameter from Period I to Period II (III or IV). * indicates significance at least at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A. All Firms 
  All Testing Stocks (123) Controlling Stocks (223) 
  Period I Period II t-valuez-score Period III
t-value
z-score Period IV 
t-value
z-score Period I Period II Period III Period IV
ρ Mean 0.2451 0.2650 t=-0.19 0.2753 t=-1.49 0.2700 t=-0.72 0.2424 0.2635 0.2834 0.2717
 Median 0.2424 0.2651 z=-0.49 0.2802 z=-1.69 0.2688 z=0.02 0.0457 0.0460 0.0543 0.0589
 Std. Err. 0.0057 0.0059  0.0058  0.0066  0.0031 0.0031 0.0036 0.0039
θ Mean 0.0114 0.0125 t=1.84 0.0118 t=2.41* 0.0127 t=3.05* 0.0128 0.0131 0.0122 0.0122
 Median 0.0093 0.0100 z=1.87 0.0101 z=2.12* 0.0103 z=2.66* 0.0096 0.0098 0.0099 0.0105
 Std. Err. 0.0008 0.0009  0.0008  0.0009  0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
φ Mean 0.0236 0.0217 t=0.02 0.0226 t=-0.95 0.0224 t=-1.76 0.0224 0.0210 0.0225 0.0229
 Median 0.0244 0.0222 z=-0.01 0.0238 z=-1.51 0.0241 z=-2.08* 0.0050 0.0056 0.0057 0.0066
 Std. Err. 0.0005 0.0006  0.0005  0.0006  0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
θ/(θ+φ) Mean 31.02% 34.53% t=1.65 32.86% t=2.46* 31.55% t=2.97* 33.96% 36.10% 32.92% 32.64%
 Median 28.03% 31.03% z=1.39 29.21% z=1.94 31.78% z=2.44* 18.32% 19.88% 19.80% 21.79%
ISPR Mean 0.0699 0.0685 t=0.91 0.0689 t=-0.01 0.0702 t=0.69 0.0705 0.0682 0.0696 0.0700
($) Median 0.0672 0.0659 z=1.52 0.0669 z=0.03 0.0671 z=1.48 0.0125 0.0119 0.0122 0.0125
(Continued) 
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Table 4 continued. 
 
Panel B. Partisan Industry Firms (102) 
  Period I Period II t-value z-score Period III
t-value 
z-score Period IV 
t-value 
z-score 
ρ Mean 0.2467 0.2681 t=0.09 0.2780 t=-1.38 0.2739 t=-0.44 
 Median 0.0670 0.0711 z=-0.26 0.0715 z=-1.45 0.0787 z=0.25 
 Std. Err. 0.0066 0.0070  0.0071  0.0078  
θ Mean 0.0105 0.0115 t=1.38 0.0107 t=1.79 0.0114 t=2.25* 
 Median 0.0080 0.0092 z=1.51 0.0077 z=1.79 0.0085 z=2.19* 
 Std. Err. 0.0008 0.0009  0.0008  0.0008  
φ Mean 0.0238 0.0221 t=-0.00 0.0232 t=-0.89 0.0228 t=-1.57 
 Median 0.0054 0.0058 z=0.27 0.0053 z=-1.33 0.0070 z=-1.79 
 Std. Err. 0.0005 0.0006  0.0005  0.0007  
θ/(θ+φ) Mean 29.38% 32.36% t=1.30 30.41% t=2.07* 28.83% t=2.41* 
 Median 17.02% 18.91% z=1.12 16.98% z=1.71 33.34% z=2.08* 
ISPR Mean 0.0687 0.0671 t=0.43 0.0677 t=-0.42 0.0685 t=0.25 
($) Median 0.0104 0.0129 z=0.97 0.0117 z=-0.16 0.0152 z=1.21 
 
Panel C. Top Donor Firms (19) 
ρ Mean 0.1928 0.2159 t=0.20 0.2268 t=-0.06 0.2061 t=-1.16 
 Median 0.0522 0.0627 z=-0.25 0.0705 z=0.06 0.0805 z=-0.80 
 Std. Err. 0.0120 0.0144  0.0162  0.0185  
θ Mean 0.0082 0.0094 t=1.73 0.0097 t=2.34* 0.0093 t=1.45 
 Median 0.0062 0.0074 z=1.40 0.0065 z=2.12* 0.0075 z=1.39 
 Std. Err. 0.0014 0.0017  0.0015  0.0017  
φ Mean 0.0266 0.0250 t=0.24 0.0249 t=-2.20* 0.0252 t=-1.88 
 Median 0.0037 0.0047 z=-0.41 0.0050 z=-2.38* 0.0045 z=-2.24* 
 Std. Err. 0.0008 0.0011  0.0011  0.0010  
θ/(θ+φ) Mean 22.59% 25.98% t=1.58 27.16% t=2.37* 25.12% t=1.47 
 Median 14.06% 16.43% z=1.34 16.03% z=2.30* 18.13% z=1.58 
ISPR Mean 0.0696 0.0687 t=1.40 0.0691 t=0.29 0.0689 t=-0.32 
($) Median 0.0068 0.0073 z=0.93 0.0067 z=-0.42 0.0088 z=-0.41 
 
Panel D. Favored Firms (32) 
ρ Mean 0.2262 0.2440 t=-0.57 0.2641 t=-0.16 0.2542 t=-0.43 
 Median 0.2382 0.2573 z=-0.85 0.2695 z=-0.17 0.2703 z=0.47 
 Std. Err. 0.0098 0.0112  0.0121  0.0135  
θ Mean 0.0121 0.0134 t=1.85 0.0152 t=3.65* 0.0160 t=3.43* 
 Median 0.0098 0.0103 z=1.80 0.0122 z=3.15* 0.0139 z=3.37* 
 Std. Err. 0.0016 0.0018  0.0022  0.0024  
φ Mean 0.0233 0.0224 t=0.96 0.0228 t=-0.15 0.0232 t=-0.47 
 Median 0.0237 0.0224 z=0.56 0.0234 z=-0.96 0.0247 z=-1.26 
 Std. Err. 0.0011 0.0012  0.0010  0.0010  
θ/(θ+φ) Mean 32.80% 35.31% t=1.28 36.99% t=2.87* 37.44% t=2.66* 
 Median 29.85% 30.24% z=0.95 33.86% z=2.39* 37.63% z=2.64* 
ISPR Mean 0.0707 0.0715 t=2.95* 0.0761 t=3.35* 0.0783 t=3.61* 
($) Median 0.0689 0.0693 z=2.67* 0.0719 z=2.85* 0.0739 z=3.58* 
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Table 5  
Tests of Cross-sectional Variations in Changes of Bid-Ask Spreads. This table reports the cross-sectional 
regression tests of the changes in bid-ask spreads for 123 politically sensitive firms and 223 controlling firms. 
Period I (the base period) is from 7/1/2000 to 8/31/2000, Period II (the polling period) is from 9/1/2000 to 
11/6/2000, Period III (the election & recount period) is from 11/7/2000 to 12/13/2000, and Period IV (the 
post-recount period) is from 12/14/2000 to 12/31/2000. The testing model is 
ΔY = n0 + n1ΔP + n2ΔVOLA + n3ΔDV + n4Δθ + n5Δφ 
+ D*(s0 + s1ΔP + s2ΔVOLA + s3ΔDV + s4Δθ + s5Δφ), 
where Y is SPR ($) in Panel A and ESPR ($) in Panel B, P is the average close price, VOLA is the absolute 
daily change in the log of close price, DV is the daily dollar volume, θ is the information cost parameter, φ is 
the liquidity cost parameter, SPR ($) is the average quoted bid-ask spread in dollars, and ESPR is the average 
effective bid-ask spread in dollars. Δ represents the log change in a variable. For example, from the base 
period to the polling period, ΔP is equal to the log price of the polling period minus the log price of the base 
period. D is a dummy variable, where D=1 for the 123 politically sensitive firms and 0 for the 223 controlling 
firms. Parameter s0 represents the difference in the change of bid-ask spread between the favored firms and 
controlling firms, with the control of changes in P, VOLA, DV, θ, and φ. * indicates significance at least at 
the 5% level. 
 
Panel A. Test of Changes in SPR ($) 
  From the base period to the polling period (II) 
From the base period to the 
election & recount period (III)
From the base period to the 
post-recount period (IV) 
Variable Parameter Parameter t-value Parameter t-value Parameter t-value 
Intercept n0 -0.0056 -1.12 0.0156* 3.27 0.0053 0.67 
ΔP n1 0.2647* 7.88 0.2179* 5.68 0.1884* 6.63 
ΔVOLA n2 0.0614* 3.29 0.0511* 2.86 0.0641* 3.60 
ΔDV n3 -0.0416* -2.59 -0.0409* -2.60 -0.0364* -2.25 
Δθ n4 0.0982* 6.38 0.0899* 6.54 0.0545* 4.41 
Δφ n5 0.1005* 2.58 0.0716* 3.47 0.0248 1.30 
D s0 -0.0013 -0.16 -0.0040 -0.39 0.0031 0.24 
D*ΔP s1 -0.0802 -1.12 -0.0283 -0.33 -0.0924 -1.42 
D*ΔVOLA s2 -0.0346 -1.10 0.0158 0.50 -0.0339 -1.13 
D*ΔDV s3 0.0460 1.59 -0.0034 -0.09 0.0158 0.49 
D*Δθ s4 -0.0415 -1.87 -0.0201 -0.88 0.0082 0.41 
D*Δφ s5 0.0090 0.18 0.0119 0.31 0.0438 1.16 
Adj. R2  43.43%  40.18%  33.39%  
Panel B. Test of Changes in ESPR ($) 
Intercept n0 0.0010 0.23 0.0037 0.76 -0.0005 -0.07 
ΔP n1 0.2067* 6.59 0.1640* 5.07 0.1660* 6.67 
ΔVOLA n2 0.0471* 2.49 0.0695* 3.58 0.0567* 3.01 
ΔDV n3 -0.0055 -0.38 -0.0067 -0.47 0.0006 0.05 
Δθ n4 0.0804* 5.69 0.0769* 5.99 0.0476* 4.68 
Δφ n5 0.0875* 2.93 0.0433 1.42 0.0137 0.76 
D s0 0.0060 0.86 0.0078 0.74 0.0027 0.29 
D*ΔP s1 -0.0512 -0.88 -0.0270 -0.35 -0.0313 -0.52 
D*ΔVOLA s2 0.0078 0.25 -0.0100 -0.31 -0.0114 -0.38 
D*ΔDV s3 0.0192 0.71 -0.0213 -0.68 0.0028 0.11 
D*Δθ s4 -0.0343 -1.7 -0.0369 -1.78 0.0111 0.7 
D*Δφ s5 0.0030 0.06 -0.0630 -1.13 0.0221 0.81 
Adj. R2  44.12%  34.27%  43.32%  
 




Tests of the Effects of Error-in-Variable on Spread Regressions. This table provides the GMM tests for the 
effects of error-in-variable caused by the two-step regression. The following is the model: 
 
ΔY = n0 + n1ΔP + n2ΔVOLA + n3ΔDV + n4Δθ + n5Δφ+ n6ΔPtheta 
+ D*(s0 + s1ΔP + s2ΔVOLA + s3ΔDV + s4Δθ + s5Δφ+ s6ΔPtheta), 
 
where Ptheta is the portfolio θ; that is, the average of θ values for all stocks in each portfolio. We rank the 
firms in both the testing (123 firms) and controlling (223 firms) samples by θ and divide them into 10 
portfolios in each sample. The remaining variables are as defined in Table 5. We conduct two tests. In Test 1, 
Ptheta replaces θ of the individual stocks. In Test 2, both Ptheta and θ are included. * indicates significance 
at least at the five-percent level. 
 
Panel A. Test of Changes in SPR ($) 
  From the base period to the polling period 
From the base period to the 
election & recount period 
From the base period to the 
post-recount period 
Variable Parameter Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 
Intercept n0 -0.0005 -0.0057 0.0124* 0.0161* 0.0017 0.0063 
  (-0.07) (-1.16) (2.32) (3.26) (0.21) (0.80) 
ΔP n1 0.1660* 0.2560* 0.2690* 0.2171* 0.2031* 0.1794* 
  (6.67) (7.73) (7.48) (5.60) (7.28) (6.23) 
ΔVOLA n2 0.0567* 0.0584* 0.0689* 0.0512* 0.0680* 0.0611* 
  (3.01) (3.13) (3.59) (2.88) (3.68) (3.34) 
ΔDV n3 0.0006 -0.0401* -0.0495* -0.0405* -0.0269 -0.0299 
  (0.05) (-2.44) (-2.98) (-2.55) (-1.58) (-1.87) 
Δθ n4  0.0789*  0.0782*  0.0420* 
   (5.23)  (4.16)  (2.84) 
Δφ n5 0.0137 0.1013* 0.0363 0.0718* 0.0140 0.0293 
  (0.76) (2.56) (1.59) (3.51) (0.73) (1.55) 
ΔPtheta n6 0.0476* 0.0351 0.0679* 0.0196 0.0547* 0.0275 
  (4.68) (1.94) (4.92) (1.04) (4.78) (1.76) 
D s0 0.0027 -0.0011 0.0001 -0.0044 0.0121 0.0044 
  (0.29) (-0.13) (0.01) (-0.42) (0.94) (0.35) 
D*ΔP s1 -0.0313 -0.0748 -0.0515 -0.0283 -0.0927 -0.0855 
  (-0.52) (-1.03) (-0.60) (-0.33) (-1.46) (-1.32) 
D*ΔVOLA s2 -0.0114 -0.0327 0.0118 0.0156 -0.0307 -0.0303 
  (-0.38) (-1.03) (0.37) (0.50) (-1.01) (-1.01) 
D*ΔDV s3 0.0028 0.0453 0.0080 -0.0035 -0.0014 0.0071 
  (0.11) (1.55) (0.22) (-0.09) (-0.05) (0.22) 
D*Δθ s4  -0.0264  -0.0091  0.0078 
   (-1.30)  (-0.30)  (0.30) 
D*Δφ s5 0.0221 0.0093 0.0163 0.0115 0.0482 0.0430 
  (0.81) (0.18) (0.39) (0.30) (1.48) (1.17) 
D*ΔPtheta s6 0.0111 -0.0274 -0.0213 -0.0178 0.0019 -0.0041 
  (0.70) (-0.97) (-0.91) (-0.56) (0.11) (-0.16) 
Adj. R2  39.51% 43.73% 34.13% 40.05% 30.76% 33.88% 
(Continued)




Table 6 continued. 
 
Panel B. Test of Changes in ESPR ($) 
  From the base period to the polling period 
From the base period to the 
election & recount period 
From the base period to the 
post-recount period 
Variable Parameter Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 
Intercept n0 -0.0021 0.0071 0.0008 0.0044 -0.0053 -0.0003 
  (-0.49) (1.21) (0.16) (0.89) (-0.80) (-0.05) 
ΔP n1 0.2462* 0.1532* 0.1943* 0.1446* 0.1901* 0.1645* 
  (7.22) (3.08) (6.38) (4.68) (7.71) (6.52) 
ΔVOLA n2 0.0508* 0.0542* 0.0764* 0.0594* 0.0637* 0.0562* 
  (2.58) (2.18) (4.06) (3.29) (3.40) (2.96) 
ΔDV n3 -0.0085 0.0142 -0.0129 -0.0043 0.0049 0.0017 
  (-0.54) (0.63) (-0.88) (-0.30) (0.34) (0.13) 
Δθ n4  0.0432*  0.0748*  0.0455* 
   (2.93)  (4.75)  (3.57) 
Δφ n5 0.0504 0.0912* 0.0416 0.0755* -0.0021 0.0144 
  (1.71) (2.18) (1.79) (3.91) (-0.12) (0.80) 
ΔPtheta n6 0.0654* 0.0054 0.0622* 0.0159 0.0341* 0.0046 
  (3.75) (0.28) (4.80) (1.00) (3.41) (0.37) 
D s0 0.0103 -0.0061 0.0063 0.0023 0.0123 0.0044 
  (1.48) (-0.88) (0.66) (0.24) (1.35) (0.48) 
D*ΔP s1 -0.0797 0.0481 -0.0059 0.0266 -0.0412 -0.0315 
  (-1.30) (0.79) (-0.09) (0.38) (-0.68) (-0.52) 
D*ΔVOLA s2 0.0116 -0.0089 0.0018 0.0104 -0.0116 -0.0103 
  (0.35) (-0.28) (0.06) (0.36) (-0.38) (-0.35) 
D*ΔDV s3 0.0195 -0.0188 -0.0118 -0.0219 -0.0087 -0.0002 
  (0.69) (-0.69) (-0.39) (-0.71) (-0.31) (-0.01) 
D*Δθ s4  0.0252  -0.0336  0.0025 
   (1.29)  (-1.42)  (0.13) 
D*Δφ s5 0.0289 -0.0032 -0.0394 -0.0550 0.0313 0.0245 
  (0.58) (-0.06) (-0.96) (-1.43) (1.10) (0.88) 
D*ΔPtheta s6 -0.0295 0.0165 -0.0326 -0.0131 0.0174 0.0149 
  (-1.19) (0.65) (-1.41) (-0.47) (1.11) (0.76) 
Adj. R2  40.08% 44.10% 32.34% 37.39% 39.09% 43.21% 
 




Bivariate Portfolio Analysis. Panel A reports log spread changes of bivariate portfolios of the 123 politically 
sensitive firms sorted independently by Δθ and Δφ where θ is the information cost parameter and φ is the 
liquidity cost parameter. SPR ($) is the quoted bid-ask spread in dollars, and ESPR is the effective bid-ask 
spread in dollars. We sort the politically sensitive firms independently into three Δθ portfolios and two Δφ 
portfolios where Δ represents the log change in a variable between two subperiods in the 2000 election. Panel 
B reports log spread changes of bivariate portfolios of the 223 controlling firms sorted independently by Δθ 
and Δφ. Panel C reports the difference between log spread changes of testing and controlling firms. These 
spread change differences are sorted independently by )( CT θθ Δ−Δ  and )( CT φφ Δ−Δ  where the 
superscripts T and C represent the testing and controlling firms, respectively. * indicates significance at least 
at the 5% level and † represents significance at the 10% level. 
 
Panel A. All Testing Firms (123) 
ΔSPR($) ΔESPR($) 
Δθ/Δφ Low High Δθ/Δφ Low High 
From period I to II 
Low -0.0565 -0.0229 Low -0.0348 0.0019 
Middle -0.0067 -0.0006 Middle 0.0063 0.0152 
High 0.0144 0.0403 High 0.0388 0.0527 
From period I to III 
Low -0.0582 -0.0345 Low -0.0367 -0.0271 
Middle 0.0221 0.0619 Middle 0.0038 0.0538 
High 0.0470 0.0370 High 0.0487 0.0297 
From period I to IV 
Low -0.0756 -0.0123 Low -0.0823 -0.0212 
Middle 0.0280 0.0434 Middle 0.0318 0.0580 
High 0.0556 0.0302 High 0.0709 0.0463 
Panel B. Controlling Firms (223) 
From period I to II 
Low -0.0896 -0.0462 Low -0.0714 -0.0261 
Middle -0.0245 -0.0040 Middle -0.0100 0.0085 
High 0.0498 0.0704 High 0.0505 0.0624 
From period I to III 
Low -0.0821 -0.0411 Low -0.0927 -0.0387 
Middle 0.0201 0.0397 Middle 0.0235 0.0427 
High 0.0556 0.0855 High 0.0387 0.0473 
From period I to IV 
Low -0.0434 -0.0583 Low -0.0511 -0.0410 
Middle 0.0091 0.0371 Middle 0.0146 0.0339 
High 0.0592 0.1286 High 0.0593 0.0961 
Panel C. Difference between Testing and Controlling Firms  
ΔSPR($) ΔESPR($) 
)( CT θθ Δ−Δ  






)( CT θθ Δ−Δ




High High-low difference 
From period I to II 
Low -0.0379 -0.0080     0.0300 Low -0.0161 -0.0090 0.0072 
Middle -0.0081 0.0261     0.0343* Middle 0.0041 0.0264   0.0224† 
High 0.0142 0.0283     0.0141 High 0.0195 0.0157      -0.0040 
High-low diff.  0.0521*  0.0363*   High-low diff.  0.0356*  0.0247*  
From period I to III 
Low -0.0531 -0.0008     0.0523* Low -0.0475 0.0006   0.0482* 
Middle -0.0048 0.0237     0.0285 Middle -0.0005 0.0224       0.0230 
High 0.0001 0.0335     0.0334† High 0.0254 0.0355       0.0101 
High-low diff.  0.0532*  0.0343*  High-low diff.   0.0729*  0.0349*  
From period I to IV 
Low  -0.0258 0.0044     0.0302† Low -0.0091 0.0117 0.0208 
Middle 0.0064 0.0075     0.0012 Middle 0.0083 0.0093 0.0010 
High  -0.0138 0.0328     0.0467* High -0.0048 0.0175 0.0222 
High-low diff.   0.0120 0.0284†  Dif 0.0043 0.0058  
 
